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specified amount of money without forfeiting welfare benefits. But there
is no incentive to earn additional money since earning even one dollar
above the specified amount will result in forfeiture of welfare payments.
Under the proper program incentive might be retained. One suggested ap-
proach calls for the use of a negative income tax."a This approach would
grant a specified amount of income to a basic family unit and then tax
any additional income earned by the recipient at a comparatively high
(e.g., fifty per cent) tax rate until the total amount of income adjusted
by the high tax equals the amount of disposable income under the positive
tax system. In effect, the negative income tax system provides each eligible
recipient with a minimum income and then reduces the net benefit propor-
tionately by the amount of money earned by the recipient. Thus, contrary
to present state programs, incentive to earn money is not reduced at any
given point. 4 But regardless of whether a negative income tax or any other
federal approach is adopted, it is apparent that Green heralds some sort of
social reform.
Stanley R. Huller
Depreciation of Pipeline Easement Costs
Shell Pipe Line Corporation transports crude oil and petroleum products
through a pipeline system composed of gathering lines, secondary trunk
lines, and primary trunk lines.' For federal income tax purposes Shell was
allowed to depreciate its right-of-way easement costs only for its gather-
ing lines.! Shell brought suit in the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas for refund of excess income taxes paid, claiming that it
should be allowed to depreciate both primary and secondary trunk line
easement costs as well. Prior to trial, the Internal Revenue Service conceded
that Shell was entitled to a depreciation deduction for its secondary pipe-
line rights-of-way, leaving in issue only the deduction claimed for the
primary trunk line rights-of-way. Held: Primary trunk line rights-of-way
costs incurred by an oil pipeline common carrier are depreciable because
such assets have a limited useful life which can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy. Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.
Tex. 1967).
I. INVESTMENTS IN PIPELINE RIGHTS-OF-WAY
The typical pipeline right-of-way agreement involves the payment of a
lump sum for the privilege of laying and maintaining the pipeline.' The
"aSee Tobin, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L.J. 1 (1967).
"' It is recognized that neither program can actually compel a recipient to work at all. How-
ever, the negative income tax approach at least does not discourage those who are willing to work.
' This classification is used by Shell Pipe Line Corporation only for tax purposes. It is not pre-
scribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission system of accounting, which distinguishes only
between gathering systems and trunk systems.
During the years 1930-1943 the Internal Revenue Service allowed a depreciation deduction
on all pipeline rights-of-way. However, since 1943 the Internal Revenue Service has refused to
allow Shell and all other such pipeline companies a depreciation deduction on the capitalized
costs of its primary and secondary pipeline rights-of-way.
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term of the right-of-way grant is generally indefinite, existing as long as
the pipeline is maintained. Frequently, the right-of-way agreement con-
tains "second line rights" whereby an additional line may be laid over or
parallel to the original right-of-way. If "second line rights" are available
the usual procedure is for the pipeline company to agree to pay the same
consideration that was paid for the original grant when the additional
lines are laid.'
Rights-of-way are acquired by purchase and condemnation at substan-
tial costs. These costs are separated for accounting purposes from the costs
involved in laying the pipeline itself, usually in a right-of-way account.
This account normally includes not only the costs of obtaining the ease-
ments, but also related costs, such as the salaries of the employees who
negotiated with the landowners, court costs in condemnation proceedings,
clearing and grading costs, damage costs, and other related items.'
Since the right-of-way is expected to be useful in future years, it is not
deductible in the year of purchase as a business expense. Rather, the cost
of the right-of-way must be capitalized. Instead of requiring the tax-
payer to wait until the easement is abandoned before deducting its cost,
the Revenue Service has recognized that a right-of-way easement grant
might be a proper subject for depreciation.7 However, the Revenue Service'
and the courts' have assumed without discussion or authority that the
pipeline rights-of-way are intangibles. Thus, many pipeline companies have
been denied a depreciation deduction because they could not show that
their intangible rights-of-way had a limited useful life which could be
estimated with reasonable accuracy. Both the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission" and the Federal Power Commission, 1 regulatory agencies for the
oil and gas pipelines, have treated pipeline rights-of-way as tangible assets
rather than intangibles. Possibly, the regulatory agencies reason that the
right-of-way expenditures represent a part of the cost of the pipeline, and
such costs, along with the construction costs, line pipe and equipment, be-
come merged into one tangible asset. This alternate classification suggests
that the Revenue Service and the courts should consider whether the pipe-
line rights-of-way are intangibles or tangibles, and not merely assume they
are intangibles.
'See Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp. v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va.
1966).4 1d. at 301.
'Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Com-
monwealth Natural Gas Corp. v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1966).
'Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951). An expenditure for a capital asset
reasonably expected to serve taxpayers in future years cannot be deductible as an ordinary business
expense.
'Rev. Rul. 65-264, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 53.
8Rev. Rul. 60-317, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 452; Rev. Rul. 65-264, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 53.
'See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960); Shell Pipe Line
Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp.
v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1966).
" Uniform System of Accounts for Pipe Line Companies Prescribed by Interstate Commerce
Commission, 49 C.F.R. § 20.2-3 (1963).
" Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Natural Gas Companies by Federal Power Com-
mission, 18 C.F.R. § 201.304 (1960).
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The regulations require that two conditions be met in order to qualify
for depreciation under section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code:12 first,
the right-of-way must have a limited useful life;" and second, the length
of the limited useful life must be estimated with reasonable accuracy."
Regardless of whether the pipeline rights-of-way are characterized as in-
tangible assets or tangible assets, both of these conditions must be met.
However, in the case of an intangible asset proof is frequently more diffi-
cult.
Limited Useful Life. The regulations provide that the useful life of an
asset is not necessarily its actual life but is the period over which the asset
may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or bus-
iness or in the production of his income."1 The useful life is determined by
reference to either (a) the taxpayer's experience with similar property,
taking into account present conditions and probable future developments,
or (b) the general experience in the industry if the taxpayer's own expe-
rience is inadequate.
When the right-of-way agreement has a fixed term, the useful life for
depreciation purposes is the life of the right-of-way as specified in the
agreement and no problems are encountered. However, when no term is
specified it may be difficult to prove that the useful life of the easement is
limited. The primary difficulties arise when the right-of-way agreement
contains either renewal privileges or "second line rights." If the right-of-
way easement can be renewed indefinitely, it is obvious that the require-
ment of a limited useful life will not be met. Likewise, the presence of
"second line rights" in the original right-of-way agreement places upon the
taxpayer the burden"s of showing that the right-of-way will not be useful
in the construction of additional pipelines. Thus "second line rights" may
"zINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(a): "There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence)- (I) of property used in trade or business, or (2) of property held for the pro-
duction of income."
1aTreas. Reg. 1.167(a)-3 (1956):
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of
which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the
subject of a depreciation allowance. . . . An intangible asset, the useful life of
which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation. No allowance
will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the
intangible asset has a limited useful life.
14 Id.
"
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(b) (1956):
For the purpose of section 167 the estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily
the useful life inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reason-
ably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the pro-
duction of his income. This period shall be determined by reference to his experience
with similar property taking into account present conditions and probable future
developments. . . . If the taxpayer's experience is inadequate, the general experience
in the industry may be used until such time as the taxpayer's own experience forms
an adequate basis for making the determination.
16 Id.
" Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951).
1 This is the position of the Revenue Service in Rev. Rul. 65-264, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 53.
The Revenue Service recognizes that this burden will be satisfied where the taxpayer can factually
demonstrate that the usefulness of such intangible assets will not extend beyond the expiration
of the useful life of a particular pipeline to which such costs are wholly related.
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lead to the conclusion that the easement has no limited useful life and is
not a proper subject for a depreciation deduction.
Estimation with Reasonable Accuracy. The taxpayer not only must estab-
lish a limited useful life of his property, but also must estimate with rea-
sonable accuracy the duration of the useful life. One method of estimating
the useful life of the right-of-way easements, the "reserve method," is
determined by dividing the production in a given year into the total re-
serves of oil and gas in place and available to the pipeline company. This
method was first upheld in 1960 in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley."
The Eighth Circuit allowed depreciation of right-of-way costs, reasoning
that the gas reserves available to the pipeline company were a wasting
asset and eventually would be fully depleted. The court noted that it
would be unreasonable to put upon the taxpayer the burden of proving to
a reasonable certainty the amount of depreciation. A "reasonable approxi-
mation" of the amount of depreciation in any year is all that is required.
Likewise, in Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp. v. United States"° the
district court in Virginia allowed depreciation for the right-of-way ease-
ments on the same rationale as in the Northern Natural Gas case. The court
stated that "natural gas reserves exist in nature in a finite amount" and
consequently, "such reserves will be available for a limited time."'" In
determining that the useful life of the reserves was limited the court con-
sidered the natural gas which had already been discovered and was known
to exist with a great degree of certainty and the undiscovered resources
which were expected to be discovered in the future. Thus, in these two
cases, Northern Natural Gas and Commonwealth Natural Gas, the courts
determined that the limited useful life could be estimated with reasonable
accuracy by the "reserve method." In both cases "the court required little
more than proof that the easements would ultimately be valueless, and re-
quired very little certainty as to the period within which this would come
to pass.
The Internal Revenue Service, however, refused to follow the "reserve
method," announcing its non-acquiescence to the Northern Natural Gas
case in Revenue Ruling 60-317,m which stated that rights-of-way have an
indeterminable useful life and are not depreciable as based upon the as-
serted life of proven oil or gas reserves. The Revenue Service clarified its
position in Revenue Ruling 65-264,' ruling that oil or gas right-of-way
cost incurred in connection with their acquisition, and certain other expend-
itures, may be depreciated where the taxpayer can factually demonstrate
that such costs will have a limited useful life because the intangible right-
of-way will no longer be useful after the expiration of the useful life of
the related pipeline.
'9277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960).
20266 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1966).
21Id. at 299-300.
21Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
23 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 452.
24 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 53.
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II. SHELL PIPE LINE CORP. V. UNITED STATES
Shell is a case of first impression, both as to oil pipelines and as to the
method of estimating the useful life of the rights-of-way.' Rather than
basing its estimation on the "reserve method," Shell used the "annual rate
method" to show that the useful life of its trunk rights-of-way was lim-
ited by the useful life of the related pipeline.26 The Government conceded
that Shell's evidence was sufficient to establish the useful life of its second-
ary trunk line rights-of-way, but not its primary trunk line rights-of-
way. As a result, Shell claimed that the Government's position was in-
consistent. They contended that if their evidence of their experience was
sufficient to establish the useful life of some of their trunk line rights-of-
way, it should have been sufficient to establish the useful life of all of them.
Shell's reasoning was that their classification of trunk lines as primary and
secondary was purely arbitrary and was not required by the uniform sys-
tem of accounts as prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
This argument is questionable since it is a well-settled rule that neither the
Government nor the taxpayer may establish tax liability by reliance on
the requirements of a regulatory agency.
Shell also claimed that the Government's concession was inconsistent
with their position in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley,"8 where they
argued that the "reserve method" of determining the useful life of rights-
of -way was unacceptable for depreciation purposes. In that case, the Gov-
ernment maintained that as proven reserves were used up new reserves or
new fields often became available to replace them in whole or in part. On
the other hand, in the Shell case the Government conceded that the useful
life of the secondary trunk lines was limited by the life of the oil reserves
in the particular areas or fields which they served. The Government's
position in the two cases can be defended as consistent by distinguishing
between rights-of-way which serve a large producing area of the country
and rights-of-way which serve particular fields or areas."
The Government, relying heavily upon Commissioner v. Indiana Broad-
casting Corp.,"0 argued that Shell's statistical data was not adequate to es-
tablish the useful life of a particular right-of-way with reasonable accur-
25 The other two cases dealing with the depreciation of rights-of-way involved gas pipelines
and followed the "reserve method." Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128 (8th
Cir. 1960); Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp. v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va.
1966).
2 The "annual rate method" is based upon retirements of acquisitions by age group. From this
data, the actual survivorship rate and the percentage surviving at each age interval are calculated.
Using actuarial methods similar to those used to determine mortality curves and life expectancy
tables for human beings, the average useful life of the trunk line rights-of-way is determined.27Old Colony Ry. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932).
2277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960).
2 Authority for the Government to make this distinction is in Rev. Rul. 65-264, 1965-2
CuM. BULL. 53, which clarified the Revenue Service's previous position as expressed in Rev. Rul.
60-317, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 452. The earlier ruling simply stated that the Government would not
follow the decision in the Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley case, which held that right-of-
way easement costs were depreciable. This position was modified in the latter ruling when the
Revenue Service stated "if the taxpayer can demonstrate in a particular case that certain easement
acquisition costs will have a limited life because they will no longer be useful after the expiration
of the useful life of a related pipeline, then such costs may be depreciated."
30350 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 22
acy. In Indiana Broadcasting the taxpayer introduced statistical data and
analysis of all the network affiliation contracts from the beginning of the
television industry in an effort to establish the useful life of an affiliation
contract by the general experience in the industry. The court in Indiana
Broadcasting, however, denied the validity of the statistical analysis noting
that since "each contract is more unique than generic," it is "questionable
whether any meaningful general experience could ever be shown."'" Al-
though the main thrust of the Indiana Broadcasting case was that each
affiiliation contract was unique, the court mentioned also that the tax-
payer's statistical data did not provide a reasonable norm for prediction
in the future because the analysis related to television's infancy, a period
marked by a "state of flux."'" The record in Indiana Broadcasting indicated
also that the prospects were that the affiliation contracts might increase in
value, or at least might not be reduced in value over the years, and there-
fore were not wasting assets.
The court in Shell dismissed the Indiana Broadcasting case as not being
"particularly apposite."'" Although the court did not indicate why In-
diana Broadcasting was not authority for Shell, some distinguishing fea-
tures may be noted. First, Shell did not rely solely on statistical averaging
of industry-wide experience as it introduced sufficient statistical data to
show its own experience with respect to right-of-way retirement policy
and practice. Second, and perhaps the most effective rebuttal to the argu-
ment in the Indiana Broadcasting case is the fact that, even though in
theory each right-of-way might be unique, Shell's statistics showed that
in this case the useful life of each right-of-way was directly related to
the useful life of the related pipeline. Shell was thus able to demonstrate
a meaningful correlation between the useful life of a particular right-of-
way and the average useful life of all the company's rights-of-way. Third,
the state of flux and instability in the television industry has not been as
prevalent in the oil and gas pipeline industry. Finally, neither the Govern-
ment nor the taxpayer ever questioned that the rights-of-way were wast-
ing assets. All agreed that their usefulness was limited; it was merely a
question of whether their useful life could be estimated with anything ap-
proaching "reasonable accuracy."
The Government also attacked the validity of Shell's statistical analysis
because of the underlying data upon which it was based. Shell's graphs
were based on its system of accounting and conformed with the uniform
system of accounts prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 4
Under this system of accounting, for each retirement of line pipe there will
be retired the associated right-of-way cost. As a result, there will necessar-
ily be a close correlation in any graph or analysis of line pipe and right-of-
way retirements. Citing the rule that taxes cannot be determined by reli-
'lid. at 583.
a2id. at 584.
"Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014, 1021 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
34In 1934 the Interstate Commerce Commission issued Docket No. 19200 entitled Depreciation
Charges of Carriers by Pipelines, 205 I.C.C. 33 (1934), requiring all common carriers by pipe-
lines to make annual depreciation deductions on rights-of-way and other classes of carrier property.
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ance on the accounting requirements of a regulatory agency," the Govern-
ment maintained that Shell's analysis was not conclusive for tax purposes
because the Interstate Commerce Commission practices of retiring rights-
of-way without regard to their continued utility was clearly in conflict
with the appropriate tax standards. This contention by the Government
seems incorrect because the Interstate Commerce Commission retirement
regulat:ions" and the Treasury retirement regulations" defining retirement
are substantially the same.
Because of the presence of "second line rights" in a substantial number
of the rights-of-way agreements, the Government argued that Shell's in-
vestment in rights-of-way had value and utility beyond accommodating
the original pipeline. These "second line rights," it was argued, allowed
Shell to extend the useful life of its primary trunk line rights-of-way be-
yond the actual life of the original pipeline, thereby rendering it impos-
sible to estimate with reasonable accuracy the useful life of such rights-of-
way. This argument was premised on the assumption that these "second
line rights" gave Shell an unlimited and unqualified right to lay additional
pipelines. This is true only where Shell had obtained "second line rights"
from every landowner for a particular pipeline. And even when Shell had
the right to construct additional lines, it could not do so until it paid the
landowner the additional consideration called for in the original agree-
ment. The court pointed out that "[r]ather than basing its argument on
the depletion of the source of supply, . . . [Shell] argued that its experi-
ence and that of the industry, shows that despite the value of second line
rights when the life of the pipe in a line is exhausted, it frequently happens
by reason of economic factors or advances in technology that a new loca-
tion is selected, and the right-of-way, as well as the pipe, becomes value-
less."'" The question is whether the court's reliance on "frequently hap-
pened" is sufficient to constitute "reasonable accuracy." Assuming that it
is sufficient, the court in Shell properly disregarded the presence of "second
line rights" in determining that the economic life of the primary trunk
line rights-of-way could be shown with the reasonable accuracy required
by the regulations to permit the depreciation deduction."
III. CONCLUSION
Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States is the first oil pipeline right-of-
way easement case to be decided. Two other cases"0 involving the deprecia-
"Old Colony Ry. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932). "[T]he rules of accounting en-
forced upon a carrier by the Interstate Commerce Commission are not binding upon the Commis-
sioner, nor may he resort to the rules of that body, made for other purposes, for the determination
of tax liability under the revenue acts."
a The Uniform System of Accounts for Pipeline Companies Prescribed by Interstate Commerce
Commission, 49 C.F.R. 20(i)-24 (1963) provides: "'Property retired' means units of property
which have been removed, sold, abandoned, destroyed, or which for any cause have been with-
drawn from service .... "
"7Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8 (1956) with respect to "retirements" provides: "[T]he term
'retirement' means the permanent withdrawal of depreciable property from use in the trade or
business .... "
"Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014, 1021 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).4
°Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960); Commonwealth
Natural Gas Corp. v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1966).
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tion of gas pipeline right-of-way easements have also been decided. So far
the Internal Revenue Service has lost on the merits in all three cases. In
these cases the courts have consistently held that all that is required is a
"reasonable approximation" or "rough estimate" of the length of useful
life of an asset for the taxpayer to be allowed a depreciation deduction.4
Nevertheless, the Revenue Service has persisted in maintaining that an
estimation or approximation was insufficient to comply with the require-
ment of "reasonable accuracy." It appears that final settlement of the
controversy as to where the line is to be drawn must await either a decision
by the Supreme Court or a change in the regulations by the Treasury. In
the meantime, the taxpayer has three decisions in his favor. It makes little
sense for the Revenue Service to continue to refuse to allow any deprecia-
tion and distort the taxpayer's income merely because he cannot compute
the useful life of the rights-of-way with mathematical precision.
As suggested above, perhaps the problem could be resolved easily by
recognizing that the rights-of-way are not intangibles at all, but tangibles,
merging with the construction cost, line pipe and other equipment to be-
come one indivisible and inseverable pipeline system. The Revenue Service
has recognized that certain expenditures, intangible when viewed individ-
ually, become merged into the cost of the tangible asset to which they are
related and are depreciable or depletable. For example, intangible drilling
costs incurred in drilling an oil well are expensed or capitalized at the elec-
tion of the taxpayer." Other examples are attorneys' fees and architect,
engineering and contractor's fees incurred in the construction of a tan-
gible asset. If the rights-of-way were characterized as tangibles then proof
of the useful life of the related pipeline would be far easier.
The importance of Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States is that its ul-
timate decision, after appeal, will have a tremendous impact on the oil
pipeline and related industries. In fact, presently, there are some twenty-
one cases pending in the court of claims and the United States district
courts on this very issue. It remains to be seen whether the holding in
Shell-that the primary trunk line rights-of-way costs incurred by an oil
pipeline common carrier are depreciable because such assets have a limited
useful life which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy-will stand
on appeal.
Robert M. Bandy
Federal Estate Tax - Fixed Monthly Payments to
Surviving Spouse Qualify for the Marital Deduction
Decedent's will set up a trust from which his widow was to be paid a
"'See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960); Shell Pipe Line
Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp.
v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1966).
"Treas. Reg. 1.612-4 (1965).
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